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: IN THE SUPREME COURT
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH
!

RAY.MOND H. ROSS and BETTY
ROSS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

1
)

LLOYD N. OLSON and FIDELITY /
:\ND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF
.HARYLAND, a corporation,

Case No.
12143

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This was an action filed by plaintiffs Raymond
H. Ross and Betty Ross to recover a $3,500 down payment on real property from defendant Lloyd N. Olson,
which sum plaintiffs, acting in reliance upon certain
false and fraudulent misrepresentations made by Olson,
r:aid to him in his capacity as a real estate broker. Olson
1

was bonded as a broker by defendant Fidelity and
Deposit Company of Maryland.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court held that a statement made by
defendant Olson regarding ownership of the property
involved was a fraudulent misrepresentation, granted
plaintiffs judgment against Olson in the amount of
$4,315.07, and held that said indebtedness was not
discharged and is not dischargeable in bankrupcty. The
court further found that Olson violated his duty as a
broker by disbursing a down payment made by plaintiffs, knowing that at the time he did so the seller was
not able to deliver a good and valid title to plaintiffs;
the court concluded that disbursement under the circumstances constituted a course of dishonest dealings,
and therefore held defendant Fidelity and Deposit
Company of Maryland liable on its bond in the amount
of $1,180.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts is inconsistent with
the actual facts insofar as it attempts to characterize
the facts and state conclusions.
2

Rather than "entering into" an Earnest .Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, Futura Development
and Investment Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as Futura) submitted on August 29, 1963, an offer to
purchase real property and a house thereon located
in .Murray, Utah, to Esther Glenn; the offer was contained in a form entitled "Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase". It was conditioned on "subdivision
platting approval by Murray City, Utah, suitable to
buyer," and also made subject to buyer being able to
obtain a re-zoning change on said property to permit
residential R3 use and to buyer being able to obtain
suitable financing. The offer further provided that
$3,980 of the total purchase price was to be paid on
delivery of deed or final contract of sale which was
to be on or before April 1, 1964, and that the total sales
price was to be divided into the number of lots obtained
after platting for subdivision with the seller to take
payment of one half of each lot upon commencement
of construction of a dwelling thereon and one half upon
sale of the dwelling or within six months from completion of said dwelling, whichever occurred first. The
offer contained the further provision that there would
he no interest payable on the unpaid purchase price.
(Ex. D-14).
Subsequently Esther Glenn purported to accept
the offer with language typed on the same form. Howel'er, she entitled this language "counter-offer" and
made her "acceptance" subject to and conditioned on
certain changes and additions. First, she was to retain

3

her home and lot and the total price was to be reduced
$2,000; secondly, she imposed upon the buyers an obJi.
gation to use reasonable efforts to obtain an approved
plat and such other items as would be necessary to commence construction; thirdly, she imposed a provision
for interest on the balance of the amount due on the
purchase price of any lot to which she delivered a deed;
and finally, she imposed conditions concerning commencement and time limits on all construction. (Ex.
D-14).

Evidence concerning a possible acceptance by
Future of Glenn's counter-offer was oral testimony
given by the defendant Olson (R. 214, 239) who stated
that Futura's acceptance was on the original copy in
the possession of Duffin Realty.
Subsequently the defendant Olson had occasion to
discuss the property in question (which Futura now
designated Future Arms Subdivision) with the plaintiffs. He informed them that if Futura were successful
in obtaining a re-zoning it was going to buy the prop·
erty. While an earnest money receipt and offer to pur·
chase was entered into at that time covering Lot #3
of Future Arms Subdivision (Ex. D-6), the amount
of earnest money paid by Ross under that document
was only $25.00. Further, Ross told Olson that when
the re-zoning had been obtained and Futura owned the
property, he (Ross) would be interested in going ahead
with a purchase. Subsequently Olson returned and
represented to Ross that the re-zoning had been oh·
4

tained and that Futura owned the property.
mony of Raymond H. Ross, R. 74-77).

(Testi-

Thereupon, in reliance on said representation,
plaintiffs signed a Uniform Real Estate Contract to
purchase Lot #3 from Futura (Ex. P-1) and paid a
down payment to Lloyd N. Olson. After deducting a commission, Olson paid the balance of the $3,500
orer to Futura (Ex. D-22) (R. 220-221), a company
in which he was one of three principals. (Ex. P-1)
(R. 198).
On February 13, 1964, Esther Glenn informed
Futura through her attorney Dwight King that she
objected to "certain ambiguities in the earnest money
receipt and offer to purchase dated the 29th day of
August, 1963," and specified certain conditions which
had to be "cleared up" before a final agreement was
entered into. (Ex. D-12). And on April 8, 1964, Glenn's
attorney informed Futura that a contract which it proposed was not satisfactory to her because the ambiguities and conditions had not been met. Moreover,
Ur. King pointed out that l\!Irs. Glenn had not received
the contract prior to April 1, 1964 (Ex. D-13), so that
consummation of a final contract could not have been
completed by the April l, 1964, closing date required
by the original earnest money receipt and offer to purchase. (Ex. D-14).
The result was that a contract of sale was never
executed by Futura and Glenn. Appellants would
characterize this result as "Futura ultimately lost the
5
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property." (Appellants' Brief, P. 4). The fact is, however, that Futura never acquired the property and was
therefore never able to deliver a good and valid title to
Lot # 3, let alone possession, to plaintiffs.
Subsequently Ross made two $88.00 payments
under the contract, but then stopped making payments
because a Mr. Lowell Christensen (who had had a desk
in the Olson Realty Co.) indicated to Ross that Futura
did not own the property. (Testimony of Raymond
H. Ross, R. 85-86). Mr. Christensen fixed the date
of this conversation as taking place sometime in April
or May of 1964. (R. 242-243). 'Vhen Ross contacted
Mrs. Glenn, who confirmed that she was not going to
sell to Futura, he contacted Olson and stated that he
wanted his money back. (R. 86-88). Ross' efforts to
have his $3,500 returned resulted in his being given
three checks in the amount of $100.00 each on or about
:March 15, 1965, but only after he had had much difficulty in attempting to locate and contact Olson. (Ex.
P-2) (R. 89-90}.
At about this same time, and as part of his efforts
to achieve a settlement with the principals of Futura
and/or secure the return of his money, Ross negotiated
with Olson concerning the possibility of purchasing
a house which had been listed with Olson by some
people named Giles. An earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase form was filled out in Olson's office
and Ross signed a promissory note for a down payment
to Olson in the amount of $600.00, both prior to the
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time that Ross had ever seen the house. The gist of
the negotiations was that Ross would look at the property and if he wanted to go ahead with the deal the commission which Olson would earn on the sale would be
applied to the money owed Ross by Olson on account
llf the Futura transactions. After looking at the property, Hoss informed Olson that he was not going
through with the deal because he felt the deal offered
by Olson was substantially higher than the price for
1rhich the property had been listed with Olson. ( R.
115-116, 136). Olson did not contact Ross again concerning the note after Ross informed Olson that he
would not go through with the deal. ( R. 137). 'Vhen
Olson subsequently filed a bankruptcy petition on April
2j, 1967, he did not list the promissory note signed by
Ross in any of the asset schedules. (Ex. P-25). Service
un Olson in this action was had on May 16, 1967. (Return, R. 7A); subsequently, on July 20, 1967, Olson
tiled amended schedules setting forth the promissory
note as a chose in action. (Ex. P-24).
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. l
PLAINTIFFS MET THE BURDEN OF
ESTABLISHING THE ESSENTIAL ELE-'IENTS OF FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONrINCING EVIDENCE.
(a)

PLAINTIFFS ESTABLISHED THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRAUD.

7

The case of Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257
300 P.2d 619 ( 1956), is perhaps the most
recent pronouncement of this Court dealing with the
essential elements of fraud; at page 261 therein it was
stated that plaintiff must prove:
a material, false representation, an intention
that the representation should be acted on in
the manner contemplated; the hearer's ignorance
of the falsity of the statement, his reliance upon
it, his right to rely and his proximate injury.
Oberg v. Sanders, Ill Utah 507, 184 P.2d 299.
The Court continued:

Whether or not the bank had a right to rely
upon the representation of Ward must be con·
sidered in the light of their relationship and prior
dealings. Ward, knowing of the method of fi.
nancing used by the bank in financing his sales,
deliberately contrived to deceive its agent.
was no mere promise or opinion; he stated that
he owned the automobile, knowing the agent
would believe him and act on his representation.
Clearly this was fraud. (emphasis added) ....
Plaintiff Ross testified repeatedly that Olson rep·
resented to him that Futura owned the property, both
on direct examination (R. 76-77} and on cross exaIDJ·
nation. (R. 100-101). Olson knew full well that the
representation as to ownership of the property was
material to plaintiffs because Ross had directed Olson
to return when Futura owned the property. (R. 76,
99-102). It is for this same reason that Olson knell'
that plaintiffs would rely and were relying on the repre·
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sentation and would be induced to act thereby; and
because Olson knew this he necessarily had to have
intended plaintiffs to act in the manner they did, that
is, to enter into the Uniform Real Estate Contract for
purchase of the property and to turn over the $3,500
down payment to Olson. It is not disputed that plaintiffs did act, nor is it disputed that they were thereby
injured and damaged.
There can be no question that plaintiffs had a right
to rely on the representations of a real estate broker
because he is issued a license by the State and therefore has a responsibility to deal honestly and fairly
with the public. Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329
410 ( 1958) ; see also Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah
zd 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963) .
.Furthermore, it is not necessary that a false representation be wilfully so. In the case of Jardine v.
Brun.Ywick Corporation, 18 Utah 2d 378 at 381, 423
P.2d 659 (1967), this Court stated that:
'Vhere one having a pecuniary interest in a
transaction, is in a superior position to know
material facts, and carelessly or negligently
makes a false representation concerning them,
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon,
and the other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can
be held responsible if the other elements of fraud
are also present.
The Court in the Jardine case cited the case of Ellis
;.Jiale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962), where,
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in holding that the plaintiff had not established the
defendant's liability for "negligent" misrepresentation
the court, at page 383, emphasized the lack of a special
duty of care running from the representor to the representee. See the discussion of Olson's duty as a real
estate broker, supra, which should be especially ap.
plicable in a case where the broker has a direct pecuniary
interest in the transaction (over and above his usual
interest in earning a commission) as Olson did in this
case as a principal in the seller.

1

It is necessary to examine in some detail the ele·
ment of the falsity of the representation and plaintiffs'
ignorance thereof.

Appellants contend that the inferred essence of
plaintiffs' case is that Olson used the word "owned"
and that plaintiffs relied upon that word as meaning
"title free and clear of any and all encumbrances." {Ap· /
pellants' Brief, P. 17). Plaintiffs' counsel has been un· I
able to discern any substantial basis for making this un· I
warranted inference.
In the first place, one of the more significant facts
in the entire sequence of events is that Olson initially
told plaintiffs that Futura did not own the property.
•
( R. 76, 101). Respondents submit that it is JUSt as
rational and justifiable to conclude that plaintiffs took
this initial statement to mean that Futura had not yet
entered into a valid and binding contract to purchase
the property as it is to assume that plaintiffs took
statement to mean that Futura did not yet have title

10

,
!
:
I

;
!

i

·'free and clear of any and all encumbrances." And
if the former conclusion be made, it was just as rational
and justifiable for the trial judge to believe and conclude that plaintiffs ascribed the same meaning to the
word "owned" (i.e., that Futura had now entered into
a ralid and binding contract to purchase the property)
when Olson returned and stated that Futura owned
the property. (R. 76-77, 100-101).

That this was the sense in which plaintiffs understood the representation is evidenced by two facts.
First, Ross was aware that an obligation existed against
the property in favor of Esther Glenn. Ross took Olson,
a broker, at his word, and accepted the explanation
that there was an obligation against the property without any further questioning. (R. 83-84). See again the
discussion of the right of the public to rely on the word
of a real estate broker, supra. Secondly, as appellants
point out (Appellants' Brief, P.13), Ross was not
unknowledgeable in real estate matters (although plaintiffs' counsel does have some difficulty in inferring
such knowledge from the fact that Ross, because he
was in financial difficulty, was refinancing his house
to gain cash from the equity); when Olson returned
only some two weeks (R. 97) after having stated that
Futura did not own the property and stated that it
now owned the property, should the trial judge have
eoncluded that Ross took this to mean that Futura had
i;aid the full cash price in two weeks time for four and
one-half acres of property with a potential for R3
zo11ing? Respondents submit that it was not incumbent
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upon the trial judge to so conclude, that he did not
so conclude, and that he was in the best position to
determine what the appropriate conclusion was.
The chief problem with appellants' contention that
the essence of plaintiffs' case depends upon placing a
narrow and technical construction upon the word
"owned" is that it fails to discern what might be called
a middle ground between the narrow and technical
construction for which appellants contend on the one
hand, and "common everyday usage" of the word on
the other hand. Respondents agree that in the common
ordinary use of the words "purchase" and "owned" it
would not be a deliberate lie for a person to say that
he owns his house even though it is being purchased
on contract; that it would not be a deliberate lie for
a person to say he had purchased the house even though
it was encumbered by a mortgage to a bank or to his
vendor; (Appellants' Brief, P.16); that it is not necessary for a person to have clear and uncontested title
to property before he can say he owns the property;
(Appellants' Brief, P.15); and even that a person owns
property at the time he commences to buy it, certainly
through a Uniform Real Estate Contract signed by
the seller, and perhaps even by an Earnest Money
Agreement. (Appellants' Brief, P. 13).
But is this Court willing to say that it would not
be a deliberate lie for a real estate broker, in attempting
to induce a potential buyer to execute a contract for
purchase of the property and make a substantial down
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payment, to say that he owned the property if he knew
full well that a judgment creditor had executed on the
property and it was about to be sold at sheriff's sale?
Or that it would not be a deliberate lie, again assuming
the representation be made as an inducement to a potential buyer to part with a substantial sum of money,
for a broker to say that he owned property when all
the broker had was an oral commitment from the true
11wner to sell to the broker? Such constructions are
surely outside the common everyday meaning of the
ll'Or ds " purehased" and"owne d"
.
And that is the fallacy of appellants' position: the
facts which they contend gave Olson the right to say
that Futura owned the property are themselves outside
the common everyday usage of the word "owned."
Appellants state it is to be undisputed that Futura
had bought the property in question at the time of
the sale to plaintiffs; (Appellants' Brief, P.15); and
that in September and October of 1963, Futura had
bought the property. (Appellants' Brief, P.13). Respondents respectfully submit that whether or not
Futura had bought the property was a disputed fact,
and that the trial judge resolved the dispute in favor
of plaintiffs. In the first place, appellants ought to be
rrLle to joint to a specific date on which the property
was purchased, and this they are unable to do (except
to vaguely claim that in September and October, but
at least by November 5, of 1963, Futura owned the
property).

13

Secondly, to substantiate their claim that it is undisputed that Futura had bought the property at the
time of the sale to plaintiffs, appellants cite Exhibit
D-6 as establishing conclusively that Futura did have
a contract to acquire the property. Since Exhibit D-6
is an earnest money agreement between plaintiffs and
Futura through Olson Realty, and since Esther Glenn
was the actual owner of the property, it is more than
difficult to discern in what manner Exhibit D-6 establishes conclusively that Futura had bought the property. One can only assume that appellants meant to
refer to Exhibit D-14. That document also fails to
substantiate their claim, however, for it does not purport to be a contract but on its face is merely an offer
and counter-offer. It is true that there was oral testimony at the trial that Futura had accepted the counteroffer on the original of that document which at the time
of trial was in the possession of Duffin Realty. (R.
239) . However, while plaintiffs' counsel failed to rely
on the best evidence rule to object to the admission
of this testimony, counsel did point out to the trial
judge during argument the natural suspicion that arises
when a party fails to produce the most cogent evidence on a question of fact without making some show·
ing of his inability to produce it. (R. 256-257). And
in any event, the trial judge was free to judge the
credibility of the witness and to accept or reject this
testimony
it is important to keep in mind his prerog.a·
tiYes: to belieYe whom he chooses; and to dis·
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believe whom he chooses; and that it should rest
largely within his province to determine whether
the standard of proof was met. Universal CI.T.
Credit Corporation v. Sohm, 15 Utah 2d 262 at
268, 391 P.2d 293 ( 1964), dissenting opinion.
It is obvious that the trial judge decided this point
against defendants and in favor of plaintiffs, so we

are left with this state of facts: Futura made an offer
to purchase the Glenn property and Mrs. Glenn made
a counter offer imposing substantial new and additional
terms so that at that point there was no valid and binding agreement between the parties. Contrary to appellants' contentions, Futura had not bought the property
in September and October of 1963, nor did it have a
contract to acquire the property. At this stage Futura
was really only negotiating with Mrs. Glenn about the
terms of a possible purchase . (See the entire testimony
of Mrs. Glenn's attorney, R. 164-175, and Exhibits
' D-12, D-13) ; yet Mr. Olson, a real estate broker in
whom the public is entitled to impose confidence, with
a direct pecuniary interest in the transaction, and knowing full well that the representation was material to
plaintiffs and that they would and were relying on it,
represented to plaintiffs that Futura owned the prop_erty. Respondents submit that it is not within the
, common, everyday usage of the word "owned" for a
person to say he owns property when the true state
of the facts amount to only an offer, a counter-offer,
and resulting negotiations.
SeYeral additional points should be examined.

15

I. Even if it be asswned that there was an accept.

ance of Glenn's counter-offer, this case illustrates a
substantial reason founded in logic and sound public
policy why this Court should make a distinction between
allowing a person to say he owns or is purchasing property when he has made a substantial down payment and
is buying under contract or has encumbered the property with a mortgage on the one hand, but not allowing a real estate broker to imperviously make such
a representation when he has only the tenuous possibility to acquire rights in the property under an ambiguous and unresolved "earnest money agreement" pur·
suant to which he has made only an inconsequential
investment. Pursuant to this off er contained in the
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase form,
Futura had invested only $20.00 in a four and onehalf acre tract.
This is not a substantial investment, and to allow
a person to represent ownership under such circumstances would enable promoters to get into property
on a shoestring, promote gullible members of the pub·
lie into making substantial down payments in order to
achieve or facilitate financing the property, but then
to claim immunity with only the loss of their time and
$20.00 if the financing is not accomplished, and/or
the owner of the property will not comply with the
"earnest money agreement" and the promoters event·
ually take out bankruptcy, as Futura and its principals
all did in this case. Respondents submit that the public,
especially when dealing with a real estate broker who

16

has a direct pecuniary self-interest in the transaction,
is entitled to more protection than this.
2. In regard to the possibility that Futura did

accept the counter-offer, respondents contend that it
was well within the province and prerogative of the
trial judge not only to take into consideration, but to
draw appropriate conclusions therefrom, the fact that
Futura failed to take any kind of action to enforce
what its principals claimed were valid and enforceable
, rights under the "earnest money agreement." (R. 183185, 199-200). After all, on the sale to Ross alone in
! the amount of $8,000 (Ex. P-1) Futura had recovered
approximately 18 per cent of the total purchase price
of $43,000 (Glenn's counter-offer, Ex. D-14), and it
still had eleven lots left to sell (Ex. D-4). This would
work out to a profit of approximately 125 per cent,
and it would only seem natural that Futura would
have pursued to the fullest extent such an advantageous
bargain if a valid and binding agreement had really
existed.
I

3. This case does not involve "a broken promise

as to a future event." (Appellants' Brief, P.13). Any
\ promises as to future events were made by Futura,
while this action was filed against Lloyd N. Olson per! sonally and is based on misrepresentation as to presently existing facts made by him. For this reason the
· cases of State v. Bruce, l Utah 2d 136, 262 P.2d 960
i 11953) and Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 Utah
! 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712 (1958), cited and relied upon by
: appellants, are not in point.
17

l

l
State v. Bruce, supra, is additionally not in point
because the charge of fraud the court was there dealing
with was a criminal charge contained in Sec. 72-20-ll ,
U.C.A. 1953. That statute requires a specific intent
to defraud at tJhe time a check is passed, and the court
correctly pointed out that if a future promise were made
in good faith but plans went awry or a bona fide change
of mind occurred, a criminal intent to defraud at the
time the check was passed would be negated. The court
obvioui;ly did not grant carte blanche as to future promises in any event.
And there is also an additional reason why Fleming
v. Fleming-Felt Company, supra, is not helpful to the
case at bar. In that case the parties had been conducting separate auto parts businesses, had arrived at an
agreement in principal (which contemplated the Felts'
retirement) to merge the two businesses, and had en·
tered into a written contract spelling out the terms
of the merger agreement. The court held that the fact
that the Felts had not performed their promise to retire
was not sufficient to prove a preconceived design on
their part not to keep their promise to retire, because
among other reasons the written contract between the
parties placed no limitation on the time within which
they had to retire.
4. Appellants' reliance upon the case of Owens
v. Neymeyer, 62 Utah 580, 221 P. 160 (1923), is like·

wise misplaced. In the first place, in that case the vendee /
alleged reliance upon a misrepresentation as to own· j
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ership made by the vendor; the instant case does not
involve the question of when the law says a vendor
must be able to deliver legal title, but rather with the
question of whether plaintiffs had a right to rely upon
a misrepresentation made by a third party real estate
broker who had a direct pecuniary self-interest in the
transaction, who knew the true state of the facts, and
in whom the public had a right to rely. Secondly, the
plaintiff-vendee in the Neymeyer case had gone into
possession immediately upon signing the contract. Perhaps most important, however, while the vendor in the
Neymeyer case did not have legal title to the land there
in question, he did have a valid and binding agreement
to acquire legal title from his cousin and he had a 75
per cent equity in the land based upon the price at
which it had been sold to the plaintiff; in the instant
case, Futura had no valid and binding agreement to
acquire legal title and had made only a $20.00 investment.
Appellants, as did the Neymeyer court, place much
emphasis upon the cases of Crump v. Schneider, 246
Fed. 225, 158 C.C.A. 385, and McNeny v. Campbell,
81 Neb. 754, 116 N.W. 671. However, the McNeny
decision (which was reversed on jurisdictional grounds
rather than on the issue of fraud) involved another
situation where the vendor did not have legal title, but
"did have a valid and enforceable contract by which
they could acquire such title;" once again, Futura had
no such valid and enforceable contract to acquire legal
title. And respondents suggest that the following quo19

tation from Crump v. Schneider is more accurately illustrative of the issues and grounds of decision there in.
volved than is the headnote relied upon by the writer
of the Neymeyer opinion:
Crump insists that the transaction between
himself and M. Schneider was affected with
fraud of the latter, in that at the time he made
the contract of sale the title to the property was
not in M. Schneider and A. Schneider, but in
their wives. While a deed had been made to
J. and G. Schneider, the wives, the evideru:e
indicates that the title to the land was not really
in them, and if it was in fact in them, the circumstances do not indicate an intent to defraud.
As soon as it was ascertained that the record
title was in J. and G. Schneider, a deed from
them was tendered. Crump at no time suffered
any character of loss, injury, or inconvenience
by the mistake of the parties (emphasis added).

(b) THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON·
CLUSIONS OF LAW ENTERED BY
THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUFFI·
CIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDG·
MENT ENTERED.
Appellants complain that the trial Court failed
to make findings on several of the "essential" elements
of fraud. As has already been demonstrated, the evi·
dence is amply sufficient to establish the elements
fraud; one is led to wonder, then, why appellants
not object to this purported lack of findings immedi·
8
ately after the trial in order to give the trial Court
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chance to correct any deficiencies. Formerly, at least,
the rule was that an objection that findings are not
in accord with the evidence could not be raised in
the absence of a motion for new trial. Thompson v.
Hays, 24 Utah 275, 67 P. 670. And while it is now clear
that
( W) hen findings of fact are made in actions
tried by the court without a jury, the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the
district court an objection to such findings or
has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial;
Rule 52 (b), U.R.C.P.;

I it is not at all clear that a party may object for the
\ first time on appeal to a lack of findings.
1

I
\

I
I

.
\
!

In the first place, Rule 52 (b) provides that upon
motion by either party the court may amend its findings
or make additional findings. Secondly, the rule states
that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may be raised in the absence of
an objection to the findings, but omits to make any
provision as to the reviewability for the first time on
appeal of an objection to a lack of findings. It is to be
presumed that the omission was intentional, not only
because this portion of the rule affirmatively allows
something that was formerly not permissible, but for
the further reason that a distinction in permitting reriew of the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the findings in the absence of an objection
21

or motion to amend at the trial court level, while not
permitting review of the question of a lack of findings
in the absence of a motion to amend or make additional
findings is founded in logic, common sense, and sound
policy. If a party deemed the evidence insufficient
to support the findings it would be pointless to require
him to go through the routine of making a motion to
amend the findings when the trial court had already
evidenced its conviction that the findings were supported by the evidence by reaching the verdict it did.
On the other hand, counsel for the prevailing party
customarily prepares the findings and conclusions, and
if due to oversight or inadvertence findings are omitted
which the opposing party deems essential there is no
reason to believe that the trial court would not correct
the deficiency. The defeated party would then have
the opportunity to assail the findings as not being supported by the evidence. Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co.,
47 Utah 91, 151 P. 543. See also Dolores Uranium
Corporation v. Jones, 14 Utah 2d 280, 382 P.2d 883
(1963).
In any event the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law are sufficient to support the judgment entered
by the trial court.
It is stated in 9 Am. J ur.2d 585, Bankruptcy, Sec.
782 (dealing with what constitutes "false representations" as the basis for holding, pursuant to Sec. 17(al
( 2) of the Bankrupcty Act, that a liability is not discharged) that "the element of fraud is inherent in and
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essential to the availability of the exception for obtaining money . . . by . . . false representations. . . . The
exception applies only . . . where there is an actual
overt false . . . representation." In this case the trial
court entered among its conclusions, drawn from nine
findings ( R. 60-63), that:
I. The statement made by Defendant Lloyd
N. Olson that Future Development and Investment Corporation owned Lot # 3, Future Arms
Subdivision, was a fraudulent misrepresentation;
and,

8. The indebtedness of Defendant Lloyd N.

Olson to Plaintiffs, having been incurred by reason of his false and fraudulent misrepresentation,
is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Respondents submit that the findings and conclusions are sufficient to support the judgment because
the trial court could not have reached the conclusion
that the liability of defendant Olson was not dischargeable in bankruptcy without impliedly finding that all
the essential elements which are inherent in an action
for fraud (the element of fraud being inherent in the
exception to discharge for liabilities for obtaining money
by false representations) were established in this case.
In regard to the sufficiency of the findings, the
editors of one authoritative text have stated that
When reviewing a decision rendered in a case
tried by the court without a jury ... an appellate court will indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of findings made by the court
below as the basis of its decision. . . . This pre-
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sumption generally extends not only to a finding
of ultimate facts, but also to a finding of secondary facts and the inferences drawn therefrom.
In the absence of speci,fic findings, every finding
of fact necessary to support the decision appealed
from will be presumed to have been made (cita.
tions omitted) (emphasis added) . 5 Am. J ur.2d
282, Appeal and Error, Sec. 839.
Further,
In reviewing the findings of fact of the trial
judge, an appellate court must give them a liberal construction so as to uphold rather than
defeat the decision appealed from .... This applies not only to the specific facts found by the
trial judge, but also to the inferences of fact
which he made from the facts specifically found.
A general finding of the trial court is to be given
the effect of a finding of every special fact necessary to be found to sustain the decision appealed
tions omitted) (emphasis added) . 5 Am. J ur.2d
Sec. 844.
The case of J ankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54
P.2d 425 ( 1936), wherein the defendant-appellant had
complained that the findings were insufficient to sup·
port the judgment is also instructive. Therein the court
stated, at page 332:
Whether or not the installation was improp·
erly and negligently made and whether there
was a loss as a result of said installation were the
issues which the court was trying. In Fuller
Burnett, 66 Utah 507, 243 P. 790, this court said
that findings of a trial court sitting without a
jury should be limited to ultimate facts to be
ascertained, and are none the less findings of fact
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because drawn as conclusions from other facts.
In Stephens v. Doxey, 62 Utah 241, 218 P. 965,
this court held that findings ascertaining ultimate facts upon which judgment rested were
sufficient though not attempting to follow the
language of the pleadings . . . . The findings,
though not as full and complete as might be
desired, sufficiently conform to the pleading.'J
and the evidence to support the judgment (emphasis added) .
The court in Ryall v. Sears, 155 Cal. App.2d 36,
317 P.2d 100, stated that "it is well settled that specific
rindings are not necessary when the findings taken as
a whole clearly show that they include the trial judge's
conclusion upon material issues. Bowers v. Union Trust
Co., II 7 Cal. App. 259, 264-265, 3 P.2d 614."
So in this case, the substantial issues raised by the
pleadings and the ultimate facts to be determined by
the trial court were whether the representations ascribed
to Olson was in fact made and, if so, whether it was a
fraudulent 1111isrepresentation such that any liability
arising therefrom should be excepted from discharge
in his subsequent bankruptcy. The lower court entered
affirmative findings of fact and conclusions of law on
hoth of these issues.

It is abundantly clear, then, that there is no need

for this Court to "overlook the fact that the lower court
did not make findings on each and every essentail element of fraud" (Appellants' Brief, P.10) in order to
hold that the findings of fact and conclusions of law
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entered by the lower court are sufficient to support the
judgment rendered there.
(c) THE EVIDENCE OF

FRAUD \VAS
CLEAR AND CONVINCING.

Initially it may be noted that it is not altogether
clear that plaintiffs had a burden of establishing the '
elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
This Court in Greenwell v. Duvall, 9 Utah 2d 89, 338
P.2d 118 (1959), pointed out (at page 92) that the
line of Utah cases requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish fraud has dealt with setting aside
or modifying a written instrument; the Court further
noted that
such cases have little weight in establishing that
a fraudulent representation which does not in·
volve setting aside or modifying a written instrument must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Many cases hold that only a
preponderance of the evidence is necessary t0
prove a fraudulent representation which does not
involve the setting aside or modification of a written instrument. 37 C.J.S. Fraud, Sec. 114, p.426;
24 Am. J ur. 118, Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 278.
Plaintiffs have, in any event, established the fraud by
clear and convincing evidence.
To substantiate a contention that the evidence
itself could not or does not sustain the findings, appel·
lants point to the fact that " ( t) he only witness called
to establish plaintiff's (sic) case of fraud was the plain·
26

tiff Raymond Ross himself," and set up as a weakness

in Ross' testimony the fact that the defendant Lloyd
Olson himself denied having made the alleged misrepresentation to plaintiffs. (Appellants' Brief, P. 10).
Respondents submit that the defendants' position
is really just the other side of the same coin. In spite
of the large number of exhibits introduced into evidence
by defendants, the critical evidence in this case, and the
eddence upon which it was largely decided, was the
testimony of the interested parties themselves; and that
testimony was largely conflicting. Therefore, the crucial
factor in this case becomes the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial judge, in the best position to make
such a determination, chose to believe the testimony of
Ross. See again the dissenting opinion in Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corporation vs. Sohm, 15 Utah 2d 262,
391 P.2d 293 ( 1964), from which the following quotation, at page 268, is taken:
The trial judge chose to believe the plaintiffs'
evidence: that the defendants made the representations stated above; and that they were
false . . . .
It would be less than candid not to admit that
a very plausible case can be made, as is done in
the main opinion, for the proposition that fraud
was not proved by clear and convincing evidence.
However, the critical consideration in this case
is as to how much deference should be allowed
to the trial court in judging the credibility of
the witnesses and finding the facts. It is important to keep in mind his prerogatives: to believe
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whom he chooses; and to disbelieve whom he
chooses; and that it should rest largely within
his province to determine whether the required
standard of proof was met. See statement in
Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 232 P.2d 981.
See also DevM v. Nobel, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d
290 ( 1962), wherein the following statement is made at
page 137:

i

Due to his function as the determiner of the
and his advantaged position in close proximity to the witnesses and the trial, it is (the trial
judge's) privilege to be the exclusive judge of
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given the evidence and the facts to be found
therefrom. This includes appraisal of the ability '
of the witnesses to know and understand and
their capacity to remember. . . . ( B) ecause of
the prerogative just mentioned as judge of all
aspects of the case, if the testimony of a witness
is affected with any frailty which might reason·
ably be considered as casting suspicion upon it
or discrediting its accuracy or truthfulness, the
court is not bound to accept such testimony as
the fact and so find . . . .
1

Let us examine the record to see if there is any
fraility in the testimony of the defendant Olson which
might reasonably be considered as casting suspicion upon
or discrediting the accuracy or truthfulness of the entire
testimony given by him. Consider the following exchange
concerning events which took place approximately three i
years after the Futura transactions:

Q. Isn't the reason you did not list that in the
first place, you did not regard that $600.00 note
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(taken from Ross in connection with the Giles
property) as of any value?

A. (Olson) No, sir. I did not remember it.
Q. You just forgot all about it?

A. It was in my files.
Q. Hadn't you made an effort to go through your

file to find out your assets and obligations at the
time you filed bankruptcy?

A. Yes.
Q. And that was in the file but you did not find it?

A. It was not in the file I went to, no.
Q. Is you final word on it that the note was in the

file and you for got about it, when you stuck it
in the file you neglected to go through?

A. It was in the file with all of my real estate contracts and earnest money agreements.
Q. You did not feel it was appropriate to (go)

through all of those agreements to look for possibly a settlement to disclose to the Referee?

A. I did not think there would be any. I forgot
about them. ( R. 228-230) .
The emphasized portions of the foregoing excerpt
from .Mr. Olson's testimony tell the tale. There is, howC\'er, a more serious reflection that is cast upon the en-
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tire testimony of defendant Olson by the fact that he
vehemently denied having any knowledge of Ross' primary motive in becoming involved in the transaction at
all. Consider the following portion of his testimony:
Q. Isn't is true that throughout all of the dealings
and negotiations that you, Olson Realty, had
with Mr. Ross-isn't it true you knew his primary offer (sic-motive) was to obtain financing
on his house, or trade down ; to get himself out
of a financial bind?
A. (Olson) No, I did not.
Q. You had no know ledge of that?

A. No, nothing. (R. 237.)
Q. Did you, yourself, make any effort to look for
a buyer for Mr. Ross' house?
A. I did not have the listing, no.

Q. Isn't it true you were trying to obtain a buyer
for Mr. Ross ... so he could get the refinancing,
(accomplish his) primary purpose in trading
down, refinancing, and still come up with the
money to give you a down payment upon the
Futura property?

A. That was not my purpose, no. (R. 238.)
Yet Mr. Lowell Christensen, who was employed as
a salesman by Lloyd N. Olson Realty in the latter part
of 1963 and early 1964, testified as follows:
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Q. Did you have occasion to learn that l\ilr. Ross

was trying to sell the (sic-his) house?

A. (Mr. Christensen) Not at the same time. This
was earlier, in 1963.
Q. You did have occasion to know Mr. Ross was

trying to sell his house?

A. Yes, I did.
Q. How did you learn that?

A. Discussions within the office was he needed to
sell the house in order to get capital to complete
the purchase of the lot from Futura Development.
Q. I did not hear the last part of what you said.

A. He needed money to purchase this lot from
Futura Development. He didn't have cash, he
was trying to get cash out of his equity in his
home.

Q. That took place where?
A. It could have been in the real estate office, or
could have been outside.
Q. Between whom?

A. This would have been either between Mrs. Oldham or Mr. Olson, or both. There were numerous discussions concerning this situation.

Q. Do you know Mr. Burton R. Stringfellow?
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A. Yes, I do.

.. ..

Q. How did Mr. Stringfellow become connected
with this whole deal?

A. I arranged the sale of Mr. Ross' house to Mr.
Stringfellow.
Q. At the time you arranged that sale, did you
know of the proposed offer of Mr. Ross' (sicStringfellow's) agreement to sell the house back
to Mr. Ross?

1

A. Yes, I did.
Q. How did you know that?
A. This was part of the entire proposal. The proposal was to get cash out of Mr. Ross' house so
he could buy a lot from Futura. It was an entire
package. ( R. 244-245.)

Mr. Christensen, Olsen's then employee, was without any apparent motive to do anything but tell an absolutely straightforward story. Yet there is a sharp
conflict between his testimony and that of the defendant
Olson. The conflict concerns the transaction whereby
Ross sold his house to Burton Stringfellow through 01· .
son Realty; Stringfellow obtained financing through
Johnson-Anderson Mortgage Co. in the amount of
$21,000, and from the proceeds issued checks among
which was a check to Ross for $6,500 which he used to
pay bills and a check which Ross endorsed to Olson
1

1
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Realty to make the $3,500 down payment on the Futura
property. The next day Ross bought the same house
back from Stringfellow on contract. (R. 80, 86.)
Respondents submit that there is ample reason why
the defendant did not want the true facts concerning
this dummy transaction brought out into the cold, hard
light of day (as was done by Mr. Christensen after
Olson concluded his testimony), and therefore why he
did not testify accurately concerning the transaction and
his role in it.
Respondents further submit that this conflict between the testimony of Olson and Christensen must be
taken, as the trial judge undoubtedly took it, as destroying the credibility of Olson's entire testimony. This
left the trial judge with only one version of the facts,
the plaintiff Ross' version, in which to believe.
In effect, the defendant made the plaintiff's testimony clear and convincing by impairing the credibility
and accuracy of his own testimony and thus leaving the
plaintiff's testimony as the only unimpeached version
of the facts.

POINT NO. 2
THE DEFENDANTS HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND THE ACTION
BROUGHT AGAINST THEM ON ALL
THEORIES OR ISSUES WHICH WERE
RAISED OR EVENTUALLY BECAME PART
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I
I

OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU.
SIONS OF LAW.
1. Plaintiffs originally amended their Complaint to

ask for treble damages; the judgment entered did not
grant them treble damages, so the original amendment
cannot be an issue on appeal.

1

2. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (R. 52)

added the alternative allegation that Olson had fraudulently represented that Futura owned the property;
the original allegation, which remained intact, was that
Olson "fraudulently represented to plaintiffs that ...
Futura . . . had a contract to acquire and therefore,
right to sell" the property in question.
This original allegation was proved at the trial,
that is, Olson fraudulently represented that Futura had
a contract to acquire the property when in fact Futura
had no such contract. Even if the amendment which the
trial court allowed were prejudicial, the appropriate
remedy would only be fore this Court to remand with in·
structions to enter findings on the original allegation.
The amendment which the trial court allowed was
well within the discretion allowed by Rule 15(b),
U.R.C.P., which provides that:

When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of th.e par· ,
ties, they shall be treated in all respects as 1f they ! l
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amend· I I
ment of the pleadings as may be necessary .to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise ! !
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these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time. . . . The court shall grant a
continuance, if necessary, to enable (an) objecting party to meet such evidence.

I

Defendant Olson cannot claim surprise or prejudice by reason of the amendment allowed because the
' amendment only conformed the pleadings to the evil dence on the issue whether he had made the misreprewhich was alleged in the amendment; that
i issue was tried by at least implied consent throughout
i the trial. And Olson failed to move for a continuance
I lo enable him to meet the evidence on this issue at the
, time the amendment was granted.
1

I

POINT NO.

a

1

THE LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT FIDELI TY AND DEPOSIT COMP ANY OF
HARYLAND "\VAS CLEARLY ESTABLISH-

1

1. Defendant Fidelity and Deposit Company of

i

ED.

(hereinafter referred to as Fidelity) bonded
i the defendant Olson in the sum of $1,000.00 in favor of
and for the benefit and protection of any person interI.
for the payment of said sum and the faithful ob1
' servance of the bond. (Ex. D-9.) See Sec. 61-2-6 (b),
i U.C.A. 1953. If this Court holds, as it should do, that
\ rlaintiffs have proved a right to recover against the deJ
Olson for fraudulent
1 plamtiffs have clearly proved a right to recover agamst
j

I
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the defendant bonding company. The plain theory of
the original Complaint is that plaintiffs are entitled to
recover from Fidelity because they were damaged by
fraudulent misrepresentation of defendant Olson while
he was bonded by it for their protection. Fidelity cannot
complain of a lack of notice of this theory. And if it complains of a lack of findings, the appropriate action for
this Court to take is to remand with directions to make
additional findings. A remand is not necessary, however;
see discussion supra, pages 22-25.
2. Fidelity makes the further complaint that the
theory that plaintiffs are entitled to proceed against it
on the grounds of a course of dishonest dealings is
wholly outside the case and not a part of the pleadings.
Respondents submit that this theory is encompassed by
the pleadings, and that even if it is not so encompassed,
Fidelity was not prejudiced or surprised thereby.
Paragraph Two of the Complaints alleges that Olson was bonded by Fidelity to abide by the laws of Utah
and the regulations respecting real estate brokers and
their dealings with persons in the State of Utah respect·
ing real property. Fidelity therefore had notice that
plaintiffs' action would not be limited to a theory of
fraudulent misrepresentation, but would encompass all
of the laws and regulations of Utah respecting real
estate brokers and their dealings with persons in the
5tate of Utah. One of the laws of Utah respecting real
'h
estate brokers is Sec. 61-2-6(b), U.C.A. 1953, whic
provides that the real estate broker's bond shall be in a
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form approved by the Securities Commission and shall
be conditioned that the broker shall conduct his business

u accordance with the requirements of Chapter 2 of
Title 61.

1

Approval of the bond form used by Fidelity by the
i Commission would certainly be construed as a regulation respecting real estate brokers, and Fidelity there! fore had notice by Paragraph Two of the Complaints
that it would have to defend against violations by Olson
of any or all of the conditions of its bond; one of those
conditions is No. 12, which provides that Lloyd N. 01)0n shall not while so operating as a real estate broker be
' guilty of any conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing.
1

I

Furthermore, one of the requirements of Chapter
i of Title 61 is that a real estate broker shall not be
I guilty of any conduct which constitutes dishonest dealI ing; Sec. 61-2-11 (12), U.C.A. 1953; so that once again
I Fidelity had notice, this time of the specific theory and
I finding about which it is complaining.

1

Respondents contend that Fidelity had notice and
I is bound by all of the conditions of its bond; it knew
; from the start that what it had to defend against was any
I tanduct of Olson's which violated any of the conditions
11 f the bond. Fidelity's counsel had a substantial sus1
picion, if not outright knowledge, during the course of
· \he trial that plaintiffs were not limiting themselves to a
i ltngle theory, a single condition of the bond:
1

I
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Mr. Nebeker: Mr. Day, with reference to the bond
of Fidelity and Deposit Company of .Mar ..
. .
)
1an d , it is your statement simply that you are
claiming there were at least two misrepresen.
tations, in your case here.
I am will to waive any further reporting
of the argument if you are, because I wanted
to know for certain that we had nothing in ad.
dition, and with your statement, I am now will·
ing to waive any further reporting.

l\'Ir. Day: We better request it be recorded. (R.
253.) See also ( R. 143).
3. In any event, if Fidelity really did not become

aware of plaintiffs' theory that they had a right to proceed against it on the grounds of dishonest dealing until
the final argument of plaintiffs' counsel (Appellants
Brief, P. 22), and if Fidelity really did suffer surprise
and prejudice, its appropriate remedy was to move the
trial court to reopen the case to take additional evidence
and to grant it a continuance to enable it to defend
against the "new" theory pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 15 (b) ; it cannot be heard to complain now.

POINT NO.

4

PLAINTIFFS COMMENCED THEIR AC.
TION WITHIN THE PERIOD OF THE STA'f·
I
UTE OF LIMITATIONS.
i
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1

Sec. 78-12-26 (3), U.C.A. 1953, provides that an
action for relief on the ground of fraud shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, but that the cause of action does not accrue until
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the "facts conI itituting the fraud." It is necessary, then, to ascertain
11hen plaintiffs first learned of the facts "constituting
1
the fraud."
Ross testified that he stopped making payments to
Futura under the contract because Lowell Christensen
informed him that Futura did not own the property,
·and he suggested that I look into the matter." (R. 86.)
)lr. Christensen fixed the date of this conversation in
i April or .May of 1964 and testified that he learned that
I Futura was having problems with closing of the sale
I trom discussions in the office between the principals of
I Futura. ( R. 243-244.) Ross then contacted Mrs. Glenn,
learned that she was not going through with the sale to
Futura, and then contacted Olson. ( R. 87.) The gist of
I Olson's testimony on this point was that Ross first contacted him about a month after the Glenn deal had fallen
! through ( R. 202-203) ; on cross-examination he fixed
: the date as being May 2, 1964, and implied that at that
, iime he conceded that they (the principals in Futura)
! 1ould try to pay Ross his money back.

1

1

•

1

1

Ross was certainly not entitled to take Christensen's
·lllsubstantiated word before attempting to rescind the
'on tract; and for all he knew Mrs. Glenn's statement
I !:at she was refusing to go through with the sale was

1
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merely a breach of a valid contract rather than a refusal
justified by the absence of a contract. If Ross had a
duty to contact Futura regarding his aroused suspi.
cions, as plaintiffs contend he did, then it could not be
fairly said that Ross learned of the facts constituting the
fraud until he contacted Olson and Olson conceded that
he was entitled to his money back (But see the Record
at 231 regarding the possibility that Olson strung Ross
along as to the possibility of ultimate performance). Ql.
son said this took place on May 2, 1964, so by the de·
fendant's own admission the April 27, 1967, date on
which the Complaint was filed (R. 1) was within the
three year period of limitations. This is substantiated by
the reliable testimony of Mr. Christensen that he first
advised Ross of problems with the title in April or as
late as May of 1964.

Respondents concede that the testimony regarding
when Ross learned that there was some problem with the
title is not entirely free from conflict. Ross was alone,
however, in fixing the date as early as February of 1964.
Christensen fixed the date in April or May of 1964, and
Ross still had to contact Glenn after that. Olson himself
fixed the date that Ross first contacted him as May 2,
1964. And even Larry Birch, one of the other principals
in Futura testified that he did not become aware that :
'
Mrs. Glenn was not going through with the deal until
about April 1, 1964. (R. 180.)

'

Once again, it was the prerogative of the trial judge
to determine what evidence and testimony he would
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to believe, and it is evident that he made this
choice in favor of the plaintiffs. Ile undoubtedly did so
' in awareness of DeVas v. Nobel, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369
P.2d 290 (1962), wherein the court pointed out that the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which
must the ref ore be expressly pleaded and proved. The
court stated at page 136:

1

Accordingly, once the fact of fraud ... has
been established, as was here found by the trial
court, it then became the responsibility of the
defendants to show that (the plaintiff) was aware
that she had been cheated out of her property
more than three years before she instituted her
action. The trial court refused to so believe and
find, but found to the contrary....

IThe court continued:
·

In addressing the question whether the trial
judge was obliged to make the finding demanded
by the defendants (that the action was not commenced within the three year period) , it is well
to keep in mind certain principles applicable
where it is required that a fact be found affirmatively and the court ref uses to do so. In order
to compel such a finding it is necessary that the
evidence concerning the fact in question not only
be of sufficient quality and substance to support
a finding that it is true, but it must go beyond
that and be such that all reasonable minds would
so conclude. On the other hand, if there is any
reasonable basis in the evidence, from which
reasonable minds could honestly say they were
not convinced of such facts by preponderance of
the evidence, then the ruling of the trial court
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be sustained. (citation omitted) (empha.
added).

Respondents submit that the testimony of three out
of four witnesses is such a substantial basis, that reason.
able minds could not therefore honestly say they were
convinced that plaintiffs had not commenced their aetion within three years from learning of the facts constituting the fraud, and that therefore the ruling of the
trial court should be sustained.
In any event, the question of the period of limitations is not applicable to the defendant Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland because the judgment
against them was not based entitrely on a finding of
fraud.

CONCLUSION
There are two versions of the facts in this case, and
the primary witnesses establishing these two versions
were, not surprisingly, the parties themselves. Hence,
the one critical factor in the court below was the credl·
bility of the parties. The trial judge, in the best position
to make a determination on this factor, and exercising
his sound discretion well within the limits of his preroga·
tives, chose to believe the plaintiff's version of the factl
on all the critical issues. This Court should continue to
follow its well established rule, recently pronounced in
the case of Young v. Saunders, Supreme Court of
# 11868, June 9, 1970, that "findings of a trial court \\"Ill
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be overturned or reversed when there is competent

eri<lence to support them and that the evidence must be
riewed in the light most favorable to sustain the holdings
11 f the trial court." Accordingly the judgment should be
\ affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD M. DAY

Attorney for Respondents
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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